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The Economics of Class Action Waivers 
Albert H. Choi & Kathryn Spier† 
Many firms require consumers, employees, and suppliers to sign class 
action waivers as a condition of doing business with the firm, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court has endorsed companies’ ability to block class actions 
through mandatory individual arbitration clauses. Are class action waivers 
serving the interests of society or are they facilitating socially harmful busi-
ness practices? This paper synthesizes and extends the existing law and 
economics literature by analyzing the firms’ incentive to impose class ac-
tion waivers. While in many settings the firms’ incentive to block class ac-
tions may be aligned with maximizing social welfare, in many other settings 
it is not. We examine conditions in which class action waivers can compro-
mise product safety, facilitate anticompetitive conduct, and support harm-
ful employment practices. Our analysis delivers a more nuanced, policy-
based critique of the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, highlights several 
new unresolved issues, and identifies future challenges for legal scholar-
ship to address. 
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The class action is a mechanism that allows plaintiffs who have been 
harmed by a common defendant to aggregate their claims and pursue a 
single collective action rather than many individual actions.1 In an attempt 
to avoid class actions, many firms require consumers, employees, and sup-
pliers to sign class action waivers as a condition of doing business with the 
firm.2 Some waivers prevent consumers from pursuing class actions alleg-
ing false advertising, product defects and malpractice, and antitrust viola-
tions.3 Other waivers prevent employees from joining together and pursu-
ing claims of discrimination or other workplace violations.4 In the 
securities law context, a class action waiver can prevent investors from 
jointly bringing lawsuits alleging fraudulent earnings statements or self-
dealing by managers. 
Notwithstanding the importance of class action waivers, previous law 
and economics literature has focused largely on the ex-post incentives of 
potential plaintiffs and their lawyers to pursue class actions and has ig-
nored the incentives of potential defendants to block class actions ex ante 
with class action waivers.5 Are class action waivers serving the interests of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 1. We use the phrases “class action” and “class action waiver” broadly to include multi-
district litigation (MDL) consolidations of individual lawsuits, class arbitration, and other methods 
for aggregating legal claims for the adjudication of common questions of law and fact. The differ-
ences among these mechanisms are not relevant for our analysis. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 18-20, 
23 (outlining the federal rules for joinder and class actions). 
 2. The 2020 Carlton Fields Class Action Survey reports that 77.1% of companies use 
arbitration clauses in their contracts and 55.0% of these include class action waivers. 2020 Carlton 
Fields Class Action Survey, CARLTON FIELDS 5 (2020), https://classactionsurvey.com 
[https://perma.cc/2RBY-U8KL]. According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Arbi-
tration Study, “Tens of millions of consumers use consumer financial products or services that are 
subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses,” and nearly all prohibit arbitration on a class basis. Ar-
bitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 9 (2015), https://files.consum-
erfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GYX5-CQX8]. 
 3. Arbitration can differ substantially from litigation in terms of costs, procedures, and 
damage awards (among others). For in-depth discussions of collective action waivers, see generally 
Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class 
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); and Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the 
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015). 
 4. Some estimate that 20% of employees are covered by mandatory arbitration clauses. 
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the 
Sound and Fury, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405 (2007). 
 5. Many scholars argue that class actions allow plaintiffs to avoid duplication of expenses 
and achieve economies of scale. This is particularly valuable when the harms that the plaintiffs 
have suffered are very small relative to the costs of litigation, because in such cases individual 
actions would have negative expected value (NEV). See generally Robert G. Bone, Class Action, 
in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 67 (Chris 
William Sanchirico ed., 2d ed. 2012); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, 
Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 60 (1975); Geoffrey P. Miller, Class 
Actions, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 257 (Peter New-
man ed., 1998). Class actions are also valuable when individual claims have positive expected value 
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society by avoiding wasteful litigation and rent-seeking by lawyers?6 Or are 
they blocking meritorious legal claims and facilitating socially harmful 
business practices? These issues are of practical as well as academic inter-
est. The importance of class action waivers has come to the fore through 
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, such as Concepcion,7 Italian Colors,8 and 
Epic Systems,9 that have largely endorsed companies’ ability to block class 
actions through mandatory individual arbitration clauses. 
This paper builds on the existing law and economics literature10 by 
focusing on the defendant-firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers 
on potential plaintiffs. We foremost identify conditions under which a 
firm’s private incentive to block or allow class actions may or may not be 
aligned with maximizing social welfare.11 We also suggest what the law can 
do when a firm’s private incentive is not aligned with the interest of society. 
Our analysis delivers a more nuanced, policy-based understanding of the 
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases and identifies several new unresolved is-
sues and future challenges for legal scholarship. 
We present our arguments using a series of illustrative examples to 
demonstrate the effects of class action waivers. Class action waivers pre-
vent plaintiffs from achieving economies of scale and other efficiencies in 
litigation, but also potentially limit the value captured by lawyers and third 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(PEV) insofar as class actions reduce the per-plaintiff costs of litigation or allow the plaintiffs to 
optimize their investments. See David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Lit-
igation and the Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305, 347-48 (2014). For an 
earlier analysis on class action waivers, see generally Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Class 
Actions and Class Action Waivers, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 305 (2015). 
 6. According to Beisner et al., “One of the most heavily criticized class-action abuses has 
been the use of class-action settlements to generate huge fees for lawyers and little or nothing for 
the allegedly injured consumers.” John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson Miller, 
Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1445 
(2005). But see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2043 (2010). 
 7. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). The case dealt with manda-
tory individual arbitration provisions in cell phone service contracts. The U.S. Supreme Court 
overturned the lower court’s ruling that such provisions were “unconscionable” under California 
contract law. 
 8. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). The plaintiffs argued that 
American Express was exercising monopoly power over charge cards to force retailers to accept 
higher fees on American Express’s credit cards. Although the plaintiffs argued that bringing indi-
vidual antitrust arbitrations, in accordance with the credit card service agreements, would be pro-
hibitively costly, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs still retained the right to pursue the antitrust 
remedy. 
 9. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). In that case, the Court ruled that 
mandating individual arbitration on plaintiff-employees (pursuant to the employment agreement) 
did not violate the National Labor Relations Act, notwithstanding an earlier, contrary interpreta-
tion by the National Labor Relations Board. 
 10. See supra note 5. 
 11. As is standard in the law and economics literature, our measure of social welfare is 
simply the aggregate value captured by the actors in the economy (firms, consumers, lawyers). We 
do not consider distributional consequences of legal rules or notions of fairness and morality. For 
a thoughtful discussion of the normative analysis of legal rules see STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 663-72 (2004). 
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parties. Most (but not all) of our illustrative examples focus on settings 
where class action lawsuits are financially viable but individual lawsuits are 
not (because the cost of bringing an individual claim exceeds the potential 
damage award at trial). In these examples, the class action waiver operates 
as a de facto waiver of liability.12 
We show that in well-functioning markets with sophisticated consum-
ers, the firms’ incentive to allow class actions or block them by requiring 
consumers to sign waivers at the time of purchase is aligned with social 
welfare. If the costs of litigation are significant and there are few offsetting 
benefits from litigation, litigation is likely a social waste. If firms already 
have adequate incentives to manufacture safe products and provide appro-
priate working conditions, perhaps through market and regulatory moni-
toring mechanisms, class action waivers would be privately and socially de-
sirable. Allowing class actions would lead to wasteful litigation spending, 
thereby decreasing social welfare. When firms do not already have ade-
quate incentives and imposing liability on the firms is necessary to induce 
the firms to make unobservable safety investments, so long as the consum-
ers rationally expect the consequences of the liability system, firms will vol-
untarily choose the dispute resolution format that solves the deterrence 
problem at the lowest cost possible. In these cases, both the firm and the 
consumers get to share the increase in social surplus from choosing the op-
timal dispute resolution forum.13 
When markets are not well-functioning, however, then firms’ private 
incentive to block class actions by requiring consumers to sign class action 
waivers may be socially excessive. By blocking class actions and chilling 
litigation, firms can exploit market failures and divert value from consum-
ers and employees to the detriment of society. When consumers misper-
ceive the impact of signing a class action waiver, or are unaware that they 
are signing one,14 the price that consumers are willing to pay for the prod-
uct will not adjust to reflect the presence or absence of a class action 
waiver. In this case, firms will impose class action waivers as a cost savings 
device, and product safety and reliability may be compromised. Further-
more, in market settings where regulations are necessary to avoid corpo-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 12. More generally, plaintiffs may have an excessive or insufficient incentive to sue. See 
generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Mo-
tive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997). 
 13. According to the Coase Theorem, in settings without transactions costs or other im-
pediments, the assignment of property rights should not matter. Private parties would negotiate 
to an economically efficient outcome. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1 (1960). 
 14. For evidence that individuals do not read the fine print in contracts, see Yannis 
Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Con-
sumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014). 
The Economics of Class Action Waivers 
547 
rate misconduct (such as antitrust and employment laws) but public en-
forcement mechanisms are weak, class actions may be socially desirable.15 
Private lawsuits brought against firms that engage in illegal price fixing, or 
against employers that breach their duties towards workers, can be a criti-
cal complement to public enforcement efforts.16 Unlike the earlier set of 
cases, the reason the firm’s incentives are not aligned is that the firm does 
not capture any increase in surplus from choosing the socially optimal dis-
pute resolution system. 
The Essay is organized as follows. Part I introduces our basic frame-
work and presents a simple benchmark example to anchor the analysis. 
Part II presents a series of variations of the benchmark example to demon-
strate how firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers may or may not 
be aligned with maximizing social welfare. Part III provides an informal 
discussion of other important wrinkles and complications, including poten-
tial agency problems and possible frivolous lawsuits engendered by class 
actions. The Conclusion provides some thoughts for future research. 
I. Basic Framework 
This Essay presents simple, numerical examples to examine a firm’s 
incentive to allow class actions or block them by requiring consumers to 
sign class action waivers. Our primary focus is on settings where individual 
lawsuits have negative expected value (NEV) but class actions have posi-
tive expected value (PEV).17 For example, a consumer who entered into a 
contract with AT&T Mobility for cellular telephone service would proba-
bly not find it worthwhile to pursue an individual claim if the likely gross 
recovery is on the order of $30.18 It may be worthwhile, however, for one 
million similarly situated consumers to join their claims and pursue litiga-
tion as a class action. By doing so, they will be able to achieve sufficient 
economies of scale on the cost of litigation which, in turn, would transform 
their claim into one with PEV. When individual lawsuits have a NEV, a 
class action waiver will effectively block litigation against the firm and 
function as a de facto liability waiver. Although it is not our primary focus, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 15. Many scholars have explored the choice between private and public enforcement of 
law. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compen-
sation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus 
Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980). 
 16. See DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT (2011), for a discussion of public and private antitrust enforcement. 
 17. The Supreme Court extolled the class-action mechanism in Deposit Guaranty Na-
tional Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“[A]ggrieved persons may be without any effective 
redress unless they may employ the class action device.”). 
 18. Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Concepcion, writes, “What rational lawyer would 
have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from 
a $30.22 claim?” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Concepcions were 
charged $30.22 in sales tax on two phones. Id. at 1761-62. 
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we will also discuss settings where individual lawsuits have PEV and class 
actions allow plaintiffs to realize economies of scale.19 
Many of the ideas in this Essay will be illustrated through the lens of 
products liability.20 In particular, we will explore contractual clauses that 
prevent consumers who have suffered a loss due to defective products from 
aggregating their claims and bringing a single action against the manufac-
turers of these products.21 To anchor our analysis, we begin with a very 
simple benchmark of a monopolist (the “firm”) that sells a product that 
could harm consumers.22 The marginal cost of production is assumed to be 
$100. The product malfunctions at a rate of 10% per unit, causing (mone-
tized) harm to the consumer of $1,000, so the “average” or expected harm 
associated with each unit of the product sold is 10% of $1,000 or $100.23 
We assume that if the firm were to be sued by the consumers under strict 
products liability, the firm is guaranteed to be found liable for the harm of 
$1,000, so the only question is whether the harmed consumers find it worth-
while to bring suit. 
Suppose the lawsuits brought on an individual basis have NEV: an 
individual consumer’s cost of litigating a products liability claim is greater 
than the potential damage award. So, without class actions, consumers 
themselves must bear the accident costs and forego compensation. On the 
other hand, class actions have a PEV due to economies of scale. For sim-
plicity, when class actions are allowed the litigation costs (for both consum-
ers and the firm) fall to zero. So, when class actions are allowed, consumers 
who have suffered harm bring a class action and are made whole through 
litigation. We also assume that consumers are risk neutral, sophisticated 
and understand the risks that the product poses, and that there are no ac-
tions that the consumers or the firm can take to reduce the probability of 
an accident or mitigate the degree of harm. We will relax these assump-
tions later. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 19. For empirical evidence of economies of scale, see generally Theodore Eisenberg & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010); and Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Ac-
tion Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010). 
 20. Recent estimates suggest that products liability accounted for 11.6% of U.S. corpo-
rate class actions matters and 9.4% of U.S. corporate legal defense spending in 2020. Consumer 
fraud accounted for 16.0% of matters and 15.6% of spending. CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 2, at 
15. 
 21. The harms could include personal injury or economic damages, such as price over-
charges in the Volkswagen diesel emissions litigation. See Hiroko Tabuchi & Jack Ewing, 
Volkswagen to Pay $14.7 Billion to Settle Diesel Claims in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/business/volkswagen-settlement-diesel-scandal.html 
[https://perma.cc/283W-45UJ]. 
 22. We focus on the monopoly (and monopsony) cases to simplify the analysis. The main 
thesis will stay the same even if we were to assume a competitive market structure. 
 23. The expected value is the probability of the harm multiplied by the amount of the 
harm. It is the average harm that someone would suffer if repeatedly exposed to the risky product. 
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Figure 1. Benchmark Example (Zero Class Action Litigation Costs, 
Sophisticated Consumers, No Moral Hazard) 
 
Figure 1A shows the market outcome when the firm accepts liability 
and does not require consumers to sign a class action waiver as a condition 
of purchase. The firm’s cost of selling a unit of the product is cost of man-
ufacturing the product plus the expected future expected liability, $100 + 
$100 = $200. This is represented by the horizontal line labeled “MC” for 
marginal cost. The demand curve, labeled “D,” shows the gross willingness 
to pay of the consumers for the product and is represented by the linear 
relationship of P = $400 – Q. Since the consumers (rationally) expect to be 
made whole after suffering accidents (through strict liability and zero liti-
gation cost), their willingness to pay does not reflect their future harms. In 
Figure 1A, the firm charges a price P = $300 and sells Q = 100 units of the 
product. 
Figure 1A shows that the sale of the product creates economic value. 
The shaded rectangle in Figure 1A is the producer surplus, the firm’s profit 
margin, P – MC = $300 ‒ $200 = $100 times the quantity sold, Q = 100, or 
$10,000. This is the net economic value that the firm gets from producing 
and selling the product. The shaded triangle in Figure 1A is the consumer 
surplus, or net economic value that consumers get from consuming the 
product. This is the aggregation of the very most that consumers would 
have been willing to pay for the product minus the price that they actually 
paid. The consumer surplus triangle has an area of $5,000. The total surplus 
when class actions are allowed, $10,000 + $5,000 = $15,000, is shared by the 
firm and the consumers. Notice that the firm captures two thirds of the 
total surplus and the consumers receive one third.24 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 24. This follows from the geometry of the example which includes a linear demand curve 
and constant marginal cost. 
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Figure 1B shows the market outcome when the firm requires consum-
ers to sign a class action waiver. Since class actions are blocked and indi-
vidual lawsuits are prohibitively costly by assumption, this effectively 
“snuffs out” all future litigation and is equivalent to giving a liability waiver 
to the firm. Comparing Figure 1B to Figure 1A, we see that there are two 
differences. First, since the firm does not face future liability, their mar-
ginal cost is simply the manufacturing cost of $100 per unit. Second, con-
sumers are not made whole through litigation. Each consumer bears an 
expected loss of $100 (= 0.1 × $1000). So, each consumer’s willingness to 
pay is $100 lower compared to the situation in Figure 1A. For example, a 
consumer who would be willing to pay $400 for the product if the losses 
were fully compensated is willing to pay $300 if their losses are uncompen-
sated. The marginal cost curve and the demand curve are both shifting 
down by exactly the same amount of $100. Consequently, the price charged 
by the firm is $100 lower, too: P = $200 in Figure 1B instead of $300 in 
Figure 1A. 
Importantly, in our benchmark example, the decision of the firm to 
allow or block class actions has no effect on the either the quantity sold (Q 
= 100), the firm’s profits, or the consumer surplus. Intuitively, in a world 
without transactions costs, products liability reflects a simple ex-post trans-
fer of value of $100 from the firm to each consumer. This transfer of value 
is reflected in the ex-ante market price, which is $100 higher in Figure 1A. 
In Figures 1A and 1B, the producer surplus is $10,000 and the consumer 
surplus is $5,000. The overall division of value between the firm and the 
consumers is unchanged, too, with the firm capturing two thirds of the so-
cial surplus. Class action waivers serve no private or social purpose in our 
benchmark example, and so there is no need to regulate their use. 
II. Illustrative Examples 
The benchmark example above relied on several very strong assump-
tions: zero litigation costs, sophisticated consumers who understand the 
product risks, and no moral hazard on the part of the firm.25 When these 
assumptions are relaxed, then liability can have profound effects on the 
both the “size of the pie” and the allocation of the surplus between the firm 
and consumers. This will, in turn, have an implication on whether it is in 
the firm’s private incentive to allow or disallow class actions and whether 
such private incentive is aligned with social welfare. 
We now explore a series of variations of the preceding benchmark ex-
ample. The first set of variations explores settings where the private ex ante 
incentive of the firm to block class actions is aligned with the interests of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 25. Our benchmark example also assumed risk-neutral consumers. In the absence of 
well-functioning insurance markets, products liability has the desirable property of shifting risk 
from risk-averse consumers towards the firm. We will discuss the implications of risk-averse con-
sumers in Part I.D. 
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society. In these examples, the value created (or destroyed) by blocking 
class actions is shared with consumers and suppliers. The second set of var-
iations explores settings where the private and social interests are not 
aligned. In particular, by blocking class action litigation, firms may profit-
ably divert value from consumers, employees, and suppliers, at the expense 
of economic efficiency and social welfare. 
A. Private and Social Incentives Aligned 
In the benchmark case with no transactions cost, both the firm and the 
consumers were indifferent about whether to allow class actions. In this 
Section, we relax some of the strong assumptions embedded in the bench-
mark case to examine circumstances in which class actions have an impact 
on the market outcome. We first relax the assumptions of no (or prohibi-
tively high) litigation costs. Next, we relax the assumption that the product 
risks are known and examine the problem of the firm’s moral hazard. We 
will show that the firm is no longer indifferent between blocking and al-
lowing class actions. However, so long as consumers are sophisticated and 
do not misperceive product risks, the firm’s decision to block or allow class 
action litigation will be aligned with the interests of consumers. 
1. Costly Litigation 
Figure 2 extends our benchmark example in Figure 1 to include costs 
of litigation. Suppose that the consumer-plaintiffs’ cost bringing a class ac-
tion is $100 per consumer and the firm’s cost of litigation is also $100 (per 
consumer). The consumers will file a class action once they suffer harm 
since the net return from litigation is positive. Since loss happens 10% of 
the time, this corresponds to an expected litigation cost of (0.1) × $100 = 
$10 for the consumer and for the firm, each. On the other hand, as before, 
with class action waivers, it is prohibitively costly for the consumers to 
bring an individual lawsuit: an individual lawsuit costs more than $1,000 
per consumer and has a NEV. 
The market outcome when class actions are allowed is shown in Fig-
ure 2A. Notice that, compared to the benchmark in Figure 1A, the demand 
curve has shifted down by $10 and the firm’s marginal cost curve has shifted 
up by $10, reflecting the expected litigation costs. The market price is $300 
in both figures, but producer surplus is $8,100 instead of $10,000, and the 
consumer surplus is $4,050 instead of $5,000.26  The firm and the consumers 
are both better off when class actions are blocked, as shown in Figure 2B. 
If the firm requires consumers to sign class action waivers as a condition of 
sale, no lawsuits are brought and so there are no transactions costs. This 
saves expected costs of $10 + $10 = $20 per unit sold, and the total surplus 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 26. As before, the producer surplus is two thirds of the social surplus. 
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rises from $12,150 to $15,000. The extra surplus created when class actions 
are blocked, $15,000 ‒ $12,150 = $2,850 in this example, is shared by the 
firm and the consumers. 
 
 
Figure 2. Costly Litigation 
 
As a general matter, if class actions are costly and have no offsetting 
social benefits, the firms’ decision to require consumers to waive their 
rights to bring class actions is good for consumers, too.27 In the example 
above, since individual lawsuits have NEV, if class actions are blocked, 
consumers will not bring lawsuits and cannot recoup their accident losses 
ex post. Although class actions generate monetary benefits for injured con-
sumers ex post, the consumers as a group are worse off from an ex ante 
perspective. If the firm allowed class actions to proceed, the firm would 
need to build the possibility of liability and the cost of litigation into the 
price of the product. When class actions are allowed, the price will rise. 
Since litigation is costly, involving significant transactions costs, those costs 
would be jointly borne by the firms and the consumers. Thus, in Figure 2, 
the firm’s decision to block class actions by requiring consumers to sign 
class action waivers is socially desirable. 
Conversely, if individual lawsuits have a PEV, and class actions allow 
economies of scale and lower the per-plaintiff litigation cost, the firm 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 27. Polinsky and Shavell have argued that when there is a robust market and regulatory 
monitoring over product safety, product liability regime becomes unnecessary. See A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1443-
53 (2010). Baker and Choi examine how a liability regime can help when the market mechanism 
is imperfect. See generally Scott Baker & Albert H. Choi, Reputation and Litigation: Why Costly 
Legal Sanctions Can Work Better than Reputational Sanctions, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 45 (2018) (an-
alyzing how reputational sanctions interact with legal sanctions). Schwartz argues that absent mar-
ket failures, consumer sovereignty should be the prevailing norm. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals 
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357-68 (1988). 
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would have a private incentive to allow class actions.28 Requiring consum-
ers to sign class action waivers would of course block class actions but 
would not stop litigation. Instead, a class action waiver would force the in-
jured plaintiffs to substitute away from low-cost class actions towards 
higher-cost individual lawsuits. Anticipating the need to defend against 
costly individual lawsuits, the firm costs would rise by more than $10.29 In 
addition, insofar as consumers can foresee being plaintiffs in future litiga-
tion, their demand for the product would fall by more than $10. With indi-
vidual rather than class actions, the firm’s profits, consumer surplus, and 
social welfare would all fall in tandem. Thus, similar to the benchmark ex-
ample, the firm has a private incentive to allow class actions, and allowing 
class actions benefits consumers and is socially desirable. 
2. Moral Hazard 
So far, we have assumed that the firm does not face any kind of moral 
hazard or commitment problem. If products are experience or credence 
goods and other enforcement mechanisms (such as market or regulatory 
sanctions) are not working well, firms have an economic interest in assur-
ing consumers that the products are as represented and are safe. For ex-
ample, a restaurant chain or a food processor would like to assure consum-
ers that their food products are safe and uncontaminated and will not cause 
illness. Similarly, durable equipment manufacturers would like to assure 
consumers that their products will function properly under normal condi-
tions. Liability is a mechanism by which firms can “bond” themselves and 
solve the moral hazard problems. By doing so, so long as the consumers 
have sufficient foresight and sophistication, the firms would increase the 
potential plaintiffs’ willingness to pay (i.e., increase the surplus from the 
transaction) and also be able to realize a larger profit. Allowing class pro-
ceedings may be privately and socially optimal in these circumstances.30 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 28. Class action litigation may lead to higher per-plaintiff litigation costs. Although 
plaintiffs can avoid duplication when they consolidate their claims, plaintiffs also have a joint in-
centive to spend more money in the litigation contest. Specifically, combining many small lawsuits 
into one consolidated claim magnifies the stakes in the litigation and can stimulate more litigation 
spending on both sides. Firms would have a stronger incentive to block class actions in this case. 
See generally David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the 
Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305 (2014). 
 29. Suppose that the cost of individual litigation is $800 per unit for the firm and the 
consumer. Then, the demand curve would shift down by $80 and the marginal cost curve would 
shift up by $80. The price would be $300 and the producer surplus and consumer surplus would be 
$400 and $200, respectively. 
 30. Not all consumer and employment contracts include class action waivers. CARLTON 
FIELDS, supra note 2. Recently, some firms have stopped requiring employees to submit disputes 
to individual arbitration. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Ends Forced Arbitration for All 
Employee Disputes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/technol-
ogy/google-forced-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/ZJF2-AY5S]. 
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These ideas may be illustrated by extending our benchmark example. 
We now consider a moral hazard problem where product safety or reliabil-
ity, along with the firm’s investment to reduce accidents, is unobserved by 
consumers at the time of sale. As before, consumers are sophisticated and 
correctly perceive the incentive problems and the potential product risks: 
the firm’s marginal manufacturing cost is $100, and the harm caused by an 
accident is $1,000. But now there is an opportunity for the firm to make the 
product safer or more reliable: by spending an additional $20 per unit,31 
thus raising the manufacturing cost from $100 to $120, the probability of 
harm falls from 10% to 4%, reducing the average or expected harm per 
unit from $100 to $40.32 Notice that this investment is socially desirable, 
since reduction in harm, $100 ‒ $40 = $60, is greater than the incremental 
cost of $20. 
 
 
Figure 3. Moral Hazard 
 
First, suppose that the firm accepts products liability, and does not 
require consumers to sign class action waivers. As in the previous example, 
assume that the cost of class action litigation is $100 for each consumer and 
the firm, whereas the cost of individual litigation is prohibitively high. Sup-
pose the firm allows class actions and also makes the investment to reduce 
the probability of accident from 10% to 4%. Suppose further that consum-
ers expect the firm to make the investment, and they expect to receive 
compensatory damages through the class action mechanism. As shown in 
Figure 3A, each consumer’s willingness to pay will be reduced by $4, which 
is their expected cost of litigation. With the lower probability of harm, the 
firm’s marginal cost is $100 + $20 + (0.04)($1,000 + $100) = $164. The firm 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 31. In reality, investment in safety may be done on a lump-sum basis (e.g., through re-
search and development). We use the per-product cost assumption to preserve the constant mar-
ginal cost and to make the analysis simple. 
 32. For simplicity, we assume that the firm posts its price first before the firm and the 
consumers make their decisions on investment and purchase. This removes the possibility of using 
price to signal investment. 
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charges P = $280 and earns profits of $13,456 and consumer surplus is 
$6,728.33 As above, the firm captures two thirds of the social surplus and 
the consumers capture one third.34 
Now suppose instead that the firm imposes a class action waiver on 
consumers and the consumers find it prohibitively costly to bring individ-
ual lawsuits against the firm. Given that the consumers do not observe the 
safety or reliability of the product at the time of sale, with a class action 
waiver, the firm has no incentive to invest the additional $20 to reduce the 
probability of accidents.35 So, the firm’s marginal cost of production is $100 
as shown in Figure 3B. Consumers are sophisticated and understand that 
products are unsafe and cause accidents 10% of the time, and that their 
future losses will not be compensated. This is reflected in the demand curve 
in Figure 3B. As in the benchmark, the firm charges P = $200 and earns 
profits of $10,000 and consumer surplus is $5,000. Importantly, both firms 
and consumers are better off when class actions are allowed. The extra sur-
plus created when class actions are allowed, $20,184 ‒ $15,000 = $5,184 in 
this example, is shared by the firm and the consumers. 
The examples have shown that if class action generates significant so-
cial benefits—in particular, if it solves the problem of firm moral hazard, 
firms themselves may have a private incentive to allow class actions.36 If 
the net benefits from improvements in product safety or reliability (the re-
duction in the harms to consumers minus the incremental cost of producing 
better products) is higher than the expected costs of litigation, firm profits, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare are all higher when class actions are 
allowed. When firm profits and consumer surplus rise and fall in tandem, 
as illustrated in the examples above, the firm’s private incentives to impose 
class action waivers and the social incentives are aligned. 
B. Private and Social Incentives Not Aligned 
There are several settings where the firms’ private incentives to block 
class actions are socially excessive. In general, misalignments between the 
firms’ private incentives and the social incentives may arise when the threat 
of class action litigation increases the size of the transactional or social sur-
plus, but the additional value created is captured by the consumers at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 33. The firm is strictly better off making the investment. Without the investment, the 
firm’s marginal cost rises to $100 + (0.10)($1,100) = $210 > $164, reducing the firm’s profit. 
 34. The total surplus is $6,728 + $13,456 = $20,184. 
 35. More precisely, without any ex post liability, given that the consumers do not observe 
the safety or reliability of the product nor the firm’s investment at the time of purchase, conditional 
on any price, the firm has an incentive to deviate and make no investment. In equilibrium, the firm 
makes no additional investment and the consumers, rationally expecting this, become willing to 
pay a lower price for the product. 
 36. The example assumes strict liability. Similar results would be obtained under the neg-
ligence standard where the firm will not be found liable if investment is made and consumers do 
not observe the firm’s investment choice at the time of purchase. 
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expense of the firms. In these circumstances, firms will attempt to block 
class actions and the social surplus will fall. As we will see, such problems 
may arise when consumers systematically misperceive the risk or the im-
pact of waiving their rights to bring class actions. Such problems also arise 
when competitors get together and collude to fix prices above competitive 
levels. A similar misalignment arises when employers have market power 
and “squeeze” employees and lower the wages or other employee benefits 
for the purpose of maximizing profit. Still other (somewhat more subtle) 
misalignments occur when adverse selection is present: in a (more socially 
desirable) pooling equilibrium, certain consumer groups can be subsidizing 
others and this creates an incentive for the firms to engage in “cream-skim-
ming” so as to grab a larger surplus from the subsidizing group. 
1. Consumer Misperceptions 
Distortions may arise when consumers misperceive the impact of sign-
ing a class action waiver or are simply unaware of the existence of the 
clause. Indeed, it is well documented that consumers fail to read the fine 
print in the contracts that they sign.37 So, as a consequence, we might not 
expect the inclusion or omission of a class action waiver to meaningfully 
change the consumers’ willingness to pay for the product or the quantity 
demanded in the market. When consumers’ willingness to pay for the prod-
uct is relatively invariant to the inclusion or exclusion of a class action 
waiver, firms cannot capture the social benefits of class action litigation 
and are therefore more likely to require class action waivers as a cost-sav-
ing measure. As a consequence, firms will have inadequate incentives to 
make cost-justified investments to improve product safety.38 
We now illustrate these ideas by extending the moral hazard example 
from above. Suppose that whether the firm includes a class-action waiver 
or not, consumers mistakenly believe that the firm will take due care when 
designing and producing the products and that, in the event of a harm, they 
will be compensated for the loss.39 Thus, the consumers’ willingness to pay 
for the product remains unaffected by the class action waiver. Figure 4 ex-
tends the moral hazard example to reflect this new situation. Figure 4A, 
which is identical to Figure 3A, shows the market outcome when class ac-
tions are allowed. Following the logic outlined above, firms will make the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 37. See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, & Trossen, supra note 14. 
 38. Similar distortions arise when consumers systematically underestimate product risks. 
See generally Koichi Hamada, Liability Rules and Income Distribution in Product Liability, 66 
AM. ECON. REV. 228 (1976); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and 
Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977). 
 39. In other settings, consumers might believe that they will never be compensated for 
their losses. In that case, the firm would have no incentive to allow class actions (remove a class 
action waiver), because it would expose the firm to liability without any corresponding benefits 
(consumer demand would not change). 
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safety investment and each firm’s marginal cost of production is $164, con-
sisting of $100 manufacturing cost, $20 of safety investment, and $44 of ex-
pected cost of litigation (0.04)($1,000 + $100).40 The firm charges P = $280, 
sells 116 units and realizes $13,456 in profits. 
 
 
Figure 4. Consumer Misperceptions 
 
Figure 4B shows the market outcome when the firm requires consum-
ers to sign a class action waiver and the consumers are unaware of the 
waiver’s effects. Since consumers are unaware of the waiver, their gross 
willingness to pay is unchanged, so the demand curve in Figure 4B (the 
higher downward sloping line) is exactly the same as in Figure 4A when 
class actions are allowed. However, the firm has no incentive to invest in 
product safety and so the marginal cost of production is just $100, the man-
ufacturing cost, just as in Figure 3B. The firm charges P = $248, sells 148 
units and realizes profits of $21,904. Interestingly, if consumers were aware 
of the waiver and its implications, their gross willingness to pay for the 
product would be considerably less (the lower downward sloping line in 
Figure 4B). As a consequence, consumers in the range of [52, 148] along 
the horizontal axis are paying more for the product than it is actually worth 
to them! This is because consumers misperceive the risks and purchase the 
product even though they should not. As shown in Figure 4B, consumers, 
in the aggregate, are obtaining a consumer surplus of negative $3,256.41 
In Figure 4, the private incentive of the firm to block class actions is 
socially excessive. By requiring consumers to waive their right to a class 
action, the firm can take advantage of consumer misperception and lower 
their expected marginal cost from $164 to $100 and raise their profits from 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 40. If a firm were to not make the safety investment, its expected marginal cost will, in-
stead, be $210, consisting of $100 of manufacturing cost plus $110 from litigation (0.1)($1,000 + 
$100). 
 41. Notice that the firm has no incentive to tell consumers the truth. Many products lia-
bility lawsuits allege that firms failed to disclose product risks to consumers. 
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$13,924 to $21,904. While consumers may think that they are better off with 
a class action waiver, since they are paying $32 less, the lower price is 
swamped by the uncompensated loss: consumer surplus falls from $6,728 
to ‒$3,256. The total surplus in Figure 4B is $21,904 ‒ $3,256 = $18,648, 
which is lower than the total surplus when class actions are allowed in Fig-
ure 4A, $13,456 + $6,728 = $20,184. 
In this example, producer surplus and consumer surplus do not rise 
and fall in tandem. Class actions are efficient from a social perspective but 
reduce the firm’s profits. By blocking class actions, the firm extracts value 
from the consumers and creates a large social loss. With consumer misper-
ceptions, the firm’s private decision to block class actions creates market 
distortions and causes social harm. 
2. Private Antitrust Litigation 
Firms may require consumers to waive their right to bring class actions 
to immunize themselves against private antitrust litigation. When public 
enforcement of the antitrust laws is less-than-fully effective and class ac-
tions are blocked, firms may engage in anticompetitive conduct that raises 
firm profits but reduces consumer surplus and social welfare.42 
Let us reconsider our benchmark example where the marginal pro-
duction cost is $100. In contrast to our earlier example, we will assume that 
the product is perfectly safe and never causes accidents. So, products lia-
bility is not an issue. There are however antitrust concerns. Specifically, we 
can imagine that the product is sold not by a monopolist but by a cartel of 
identical firms. We will assume that public enforcement is weak and indi-
vidual litigation is not viable, so if consumers sign class action waivers, 
firms will fix the price at the monopoly level without any risk of lawsuits. 
This is shown in Figure 5B, where the price that maximizes cartel profits is 
$250, producer surplus is $22,500, and consumer surplus is $11,250. In con-
trast, if there is no class action waiver, then consumers may be able to bring 
private antitrust lawsuits against the firms for the overcharge, that is the 
price charged by the cartel minus the “but for” competitive price of $100. 
We assume that litigation is costly, where the cost (measured per unit) of 
bringing an antitrust class action is $50. As shown in Figure 5A, the feasi-
bility of litigation will discipline the firms to charge $150 instead of $250. 
When the price P = $150, consumers are (just) unwilling to pursue private 
antitrust litigation because the lawsuit does not have PEV.43 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 42. This Section is based on Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Class Actions and Pri-
vate Antitrust Litigation, 12 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS (forthcoming 2021), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329316 [https://perma.cc/94SG-7DGL]. 
 43. This example assumes that consumers always win at trial and receive compensatory 
damages for the overcharge. If consumers received treble damages but won with a probability of 
33% the results would be the same. 
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Figure 5. Private Antitrust Litigation 
 
Figures 5A and 5B show that allowing class actions is socially efficient. 
The threat of private antitrust litigation disciplines the firms to reduce their 
prices from $250 to $150, stimulating demand for the product and creating 
a much larger social surplus, $43,750 versus $34,750. But note that when 
class actions are allowed, the consumers capture more than two thirds of 
the total surplus, and the firms get less than one third. The firms have a 
strong incentive to block private antitrust lawsuits, since this allows the 
firms to charge higher prices and producer surplus rises by $22,500 ‒ 
$12,500 = $10,000. Of course, this causes consumer surplus to fall by an 
even larger amount, $31,250 ‒ $11,250 = $20,000. Requiring consumers to 
sign class action waivers as a condition of sale allows the firms to capture a 
much larger share of a smaller pie. 
In the products liability setting (and without consumer mispercep-
tion), as the firms made a safety investment, it increased the consumers’ 
willingness to pay and social welfare, and the firms were able to capture a 
significant amount of the increase in social welfare by charging a higher 
price. In this antitrust setting, by contrast, social welfare would increase 
when the firms charge a price that is close to their marginal cost. By doing 
so, however, all of that increase goes to the consumers and this undermines 
the firms’ incentive to choose the optimal deterrence regime. 
3. Monopsonist Employer 
The flipside of firms’ attempting to extract monopoly rent through 
price fixing is when a firm has too much market power as the purchaser of 
inputs. Imagine an employer that enjoys monopsony power in the labor 
market. As in the products liability setting, in this setting, we can represent 
the market in a graph with wages on the vertical axis and the employment 
level on the horizontal axis. In Figure 6, the labor demand curve is given as 
the downward sloping line that depicts the inverse relationship between 
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the wage and the quantity while the upward sloping line shows the labor 
supply curve. We use the concept of “wage” as somewhat loosely to include 
not just the monetary compensation, but also other employee benefits, 
such as fringe benefits, non-hostile and non-discriminatory work environ-
ment, workplace safety, etc. 
Suppose labor regulations mandate that the monopsonist employer 
must pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits such that the workers’ to-
tal monetized compensation is $15 per hour.44 We assume that, notwith-
standing the mandate, public enforcement mechanisms are insufficient, but 
the employees may bring private lawsuits against the employer for viola-
tions. In Figure 6A, if the employees are able to bring costless class actions 
against the monopsonist employer, the monopsonist will pay $15 an hour 
and the equilibrium maximizes social welfare. The employer will realize 
the surplus of $112.5 (represented by the light gray triangle at top) while 
the employees, as a group, also realize the surplus of $112.5. If the em-
ployer attempts to reduce the compensation to a level below $15, the em-
ployees will be able to bring a class action against the employer and force 
the employer to either compensate the employees or, through injunction, 
pay $15 per hour. 
 
 
Figure 6. Monopsonist Employer 
 
But, of course, this is not the ideal outcome for the monopsonist. By 
conditioning employment on the signing of a class action waiver, the mo-
nopsonist can reduce the total compensation for the employees and cap-
ture a larger surplus. With the assumption, as in the benchmark case, that 
individual litigation is prohibitively costly, employees will no longer be 
able to receive compensation through litigation. This is depicted in Figure 
6B. With a class action waiver, the monopsonist can reduce the total hourly 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 44. This is the “socially optimal” wage (it maximizes the sum of worker and firm surplus). 
In practice, regulators may not have the information necessary to do this. 
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compensation down to say $10 and realize a profit of $150, instead of 
$112.5. The employees’ surplus decreases to $50 while this exercise of mo-
nopsony power also creates a deadweight loss (since at $10, the marginal 
product of labor is $20). If the monopsonist is given a choice, it will choose 
the latter regime with no class actions, and this is socially inefficient. 
The reason why the monopsonist’s incentive is not aligned with max-
imizing social welfare is the flipside of our earlier price-fixing example. 
Suppose we are in regime 6B, with the equilibrium compensation of $10 
per hour. If the monopsonist were to marginally increase the compensa-
tion, say, to $11, while the total social surplus increases (the deadweight 
loss shrinks), all of that increase would be captured by the employees and 
not the monopsonist-employer. Unless the monopsonist can engage in per-
fect wage discrimination, with a single wage, there is no way for the mo-
nopsonist to capture the increase in social welfare. The monopsonist’s in-
centive of choosing the optimal litigation regime is misaligned with the 
social objective.45 
III. Further Considerations 
The benchmark case in Part I and the illustrative examples in Part II 
have relied on a variety of simplifying assumptions. Once we take into ac-
count more realistic issues, such as adverse selection and agency problems 
within class actions, the analysis becomes more complex, but the main 
theme of identifying circumstances in which the private and the social in-
centives diverge or converge will remain more or less the same. Rather 
than trying to present additional analytical examples, in this section we dis-
cuss these complexities more informally. 
A. Consumer Risk Aversion 
Our core insights continue to hold if consumers are risk averse. In the 
examples above, the consumer was assumed to be risk neutral: the mone-
tized disutility associated with a 10% chance of accident that would cause 
harm of $1,000 was exactly $100. In reality, people are typically risk averse 
in the sense that a person would pay more than $100 to avoid a 10% chance 
of a $1,000 loss. Indeed, risk aversion is probably the most important rea-
son why people buy insurance policies and seek to diversify their retire-
ment portfolios. 
If consumers are risk averse—and do not have access to competitive 
insurance markets—then strict liability may be an efficient mechanism for 
shifting risk away from the risk averse consumers towards firms who are in 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 45. CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 2, at 23 (“[S]ixty-seven percent of companies report 
that they faced at least one labor and employment class action within the last five years.”). Issues 
include wage and hour disputes, contractor misclassifications, and data privacy. 
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a better position to diversify that risk. When strict liability is socially effi-
cient, then absent the conflating factors of consumer misperceptions dis-
cussed above, it is in the mutual interest of firms and consumers to mitigate 
the risk borne by consumers. Let us reconsider the benchmark example in 
Figure 1. If class actions are allowed, then consumers are fully insured 
against future losses and the outcome is exactly as in Figure 1A. The total 
surplus of $15,000 is divided between the firm and the consumers with the 
firm receiving two thirds. If class actions are blocked and individual litiga-
tion is not viable, then the risk averse consumers suffer an expected loss of 
more than $100. When class actions are blocked, consumers are exposed 
to risk and so the demand curve in Figure 1B would be lower than before; 
the firm would lower its price, sell fewer units, and firm profits and con-
sumer surplus would fall. 
B. Agency Problems, Cy Pres Relief, and Frivolous Litigation 
When class actions are plagued by the problems of agency or open the 
floodgates for potentially frivolous litigation,46 firms would be more in-
clined to impose a class action waiver. Class actions are de facto controlled 
by lawyers who may pursue their individual objectives rather than the well-
being of the class members. Especially when the class size is large and there 
is no plaintiff with a sizable claim, class members may have little or no in-
centive to engage in costly monitoring of the lawyer representing the class, 
and judicial oversight is arguably insufficient. Class action lawyers can cap-
ture the value that would otherwise go to the consumers ex post. Moreover, 
when the per-plaintiff recoveries are small it is common for the litigation 
funds to remain unclaimed and, in many cases, the funds are distributed to 
charities and non-profit organizations (so called “cy pres” relief).47 Then, 
class actions operate as an ad valorem tax on the product.  Firms must raise 
the price to cover the expected payments to lawyers and third parties, and 
this reduces producer and consumer surplus. Insofar as class actions create 
a “sink” where value is captured by lawyers and third parties ex post, 
blocking class actions benefits consumers and producers (although lawyers 
and third parties may suffer the loss of rents). 
Class action waivers may or may not be socially desirable in this set-
ting. While the rents captured by lawyers and third parties may be viewed 
as a simple transfer of value, there is an important social cost from rent 
seeking. As the rents get larger, the price of the product rises, the quantity 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 46. Frivolous litigants may include parties who suffered no harm and bring lawsuits for 
their settlement value. 
 47. See generally Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Mod-
ern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617 (2010). BRIAN T. 
FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS (2019) argues that frivolous class 
actions are rare and that 80 to 85% of monies paid in class action settlements go to class members. 
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sold falls, and the deadweight loss grows.48 On the other hand, rent seeking 
by lawyers and third parties could have positive deterrence benefits, as 
firms take greater precautions to avoid future litigation. In this setting, the 
firms’ private incentive to block class actions through class action waivers 
may be socially excessive. The firm and the consumers do not internalize 
the benefits to third parties from class action litigation, and therefore might 
tolerate more product defects than are socially desirable. 
C. Adverse Selection 
In the numerical examples, we have assumed that each consumer’s 
propensity of suffering harm was the same. Once we relax this assumption 
and impose a more realistic possibility that there could be some heteroge-
neity among consumers regarding their propensity of suffering harm—for 
example, by allowing for a possible adverse selection—aligning social and 
private incentives with respect to class actions becomes generally more dif-
ficult. We briefly mention two possibilities here. 
The first possibility is potential “cream-skimming” through a subop-
timal liability provision. Suppose that consumers are heterogeneous and 
have private information about the likelihood that they will suffer acci-
dents, and that when competitive firms take precautions, the likelihood of 
accident falls for both consumer types. There is a moral-hazard problem in 
that the firm’s precautions are not observed at the time of sale. Class ac-
tions are socially efficient, because they give the firms the incentive to take 
the cost-justified precautions. However, some firms have an incentive to 
disallow class actions and charge a lower price. They do this in order to 
select (cream-skim) the low risk consumers. So, the private incentive to 
block class actions may be socially excessive.49 
Another possibility is when a monopolist attempts to price-discrimi-
nate among different types of consumers. Suppose that consumers are het-
erogeneous, where the willingness to pay for a product is positively corre-
lated with the likelihood of an accident (as may be the case with intensity 
of use). Note that liability is a mechanism for the consumers to get ex post 
“rebates” on their purchases, and the high-value consumer types get higher 
average rebates since they have accidents more frequently. So, if the firm 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 48. This is true even if lawyers and third parties are part of the social welfare calculation. 
Suppose in Figure 1A that the lawyer and third parties capture the benefits of litigation rather 
than the consumers themselves—the accident losses are uncompensated. The demand curve in 
Figure 1A will shift down by $100 and cross the vertical axis at $300. With a marginal cost of $200, 
the firm will charge a price of P = $250 and sell just 50 units of the good. Firm profits are $2,500, 
consumer surplus is half this amount or $1,250, and the lawyer/third party surplus is $5,000. The 
total surplus is $8,750, significantly less than the $15,000 total surplus in Figure 1A. 
 49. This adverse selection problem was highlighted in our earlier work. See Albert H. 
Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Should Consumers Be Permitted to Waive Products Liability? Product 
Safety, Private Contracts, and Adverse Selection, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 734 (2014); see also Jen-
nifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of Choice, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 957 (2010). 
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allows class actions, the firm is giving higher rebates to consumers who 
were all-else-equal willing to pay more for the product. So, liability is sub-
sidizing the wrong consumers. Therefore, the firm will block class actions 
because by blocking lawsuits the firm can better price discriminate. Block-
ing class actions in this context is socially inefficient. When the firm blocks 
class actions, it chooses the product safety level that is optimal for the mar-
ginal consumer. The marginal consumer is someone who suffers accidents 
relatively infrequently. Therefore, product safety is insufficient.50 
Conclusion 
Building on the existing law and economics literature with a series of 
illustrative examples, this Essay has analyzed conditions under which pri-
vate firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers may or may not be 
aligned with maximizing social welfare. The issue of whether class action 
waiver provisions should be enforced has come to the fore through a series 
of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases and this Essay has attempted to pro-
vide a more nuanced, policy-based understanding of that question. While 
the focus has been private versus social incentive to allow class actions, this 
certainly isn’t the only salient issue involving class action mechanisms. In 
this Conclusion, we highlight a few additional avenues for future research. 
The first unresolved question involves unforeseen contingencies. The 
analytical frameworks described in this paper were premised on the litiga-
tion risks being foreseen by the market. When requiring consumers or em-
ployees to sign class action waivers, the firms fully understood the implica-
tions of their choices, and could weigh the pros and cons of the contractual 
options. The COVID-19 pandemic, which was unforeseen by the market, 
creates new challenges for both the practice and theory of law. In the first 
half of 2020 alone, about 500 COVID-19 related class actions were filed in 
a variety of industries and many companies are reporting increases in liti-
gation activity.51 For example, so-called “business interruption” cases have 
been brought against insurance companies that deny coverage for busi-
nesses that had to close due to various restrictions;52 “refund class actions” 
have been brought by students against universities for not delivering the 
contracted services;53 and workers have brought actions with grievances 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 50. See generally Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, Product Safety, Contracts, and Liabil-
ity, 51 RAND J. ECON. 233 (2020). Blocking class actions also exacerbates the moral hazard prob-
lem, further compromising product safety. 
 51. 70% of companies surveyed expected an increase in class action litigation and virtu-
ally none expected a decline. CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 2, at 7. 
 52. See, e.g., Troy Stacy Enters. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-00312 (S.D. Ohio filed 
Apr. 19, 2020); Milkboy Ctr. City LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-02036 (E.D. Pa. filed 
Apr. 27, 2020). 
 53. Some students allege that the quality of online education falls far short of what they 
could get on campus. See, e.g., Pfingsten v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., No. 2:20-cv-00716 (W.D. Pa. 
filed May 15, 2020). In another refund class action filing, baseball fans have attempted to bring a 
class action against StubHub and Ticketmaster seeking refunds for Major League Baseball tickets. 
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over how their employers handled the crisis.54 In contrast to cases where 
future contingencies are reasonably foreseen, when class action waivers are 
forbidding potential plaintiffs from bringing class actions based on unfore-
seen contingencies, this throws a new complexity over the question of en-
forceability. 
Another issue that needs more in-depth examination is that of class 
certification: determining the boundaries of the class. Our framework has 
assumed that whether a certain plaintiff has suffered injury and whether 
the plaintiff belongs in the class can be determined relatively easily. In 
practice, however, the problem of determining the boundaries of the class 
and class certification may be far from straightforward. Resolving this issue 
can be quite challenging, for instance, in the case of securities class actions. 
When class action plaintiffs allege that they suffered a loss by a company’s 
misrepresentation, since the U.S. Supreme Court case of Halliburton,55 the 
defendant-company can rebut the class certification by showing that the 
securities market wasn’t sufficiently informationally efficient and the al-
leged misrepresentation did not cause mispricing of the security. Similar 
issues can arise in product liability settings when a defendant firm tries to 
show that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was caused by some other fac-
tor. Drawing the right boundaries will have a significant effect on fore-
stalling frivolous claims and overall deterrence against firms. The issues of 
unforeseen contingencies and class certification, just to highlight a few, 
raise many interesting questions that remain on the law and economics re-
search agenda. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
See Ajzenman v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 2:20-cv-03643 (C.D. Cal. filed April 20, 
2020). 
 54. Employees of Celebrity Cruise Lines have brought suit alleging that they were forced 
to remain onboard the vessel without pay when the industry was shut down. See Maglana v. Ce-
lebrity Cruises Inc., No. 1:20-cv-22133 (S.D. Fla. filed May 21, 2020). 
 55. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014). Recently, Judge 
Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York rejected the settlement proposal between Har-
vey Weinstein and dozens of women who have accused him of sexual harassment and abuse. In 
the process, the judge expressed skepticism as to whether the claims should belong in the same 
class and whether the plaintiffs should pursue individual actions. See Jodi Kantor & Megan 
Twohey, Judge, Expressing Skepticism, Upends $25 Million Harvey Weinstein Settlement, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/us/harvey-weinstein-settlement.html 
[https://perma.cc/LN4V-5YMX]. 
